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FOURTH AMENDMENT-FUNCTION
OVER FORM: THE AUTOMOBILE
EXCEPTION APPLIED TO MOTOR
HOMES
California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
I. INTRODUCTION
In California v. Carney,' the United States Supreme Court upheld
the warrantless search of a stationary motor home under the auto-
mobile exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement 2
first articulated in Carroll v. United States.3 In Carney, the Court main-
tained that the inherent mobility and the reduced expectation of pri-
vacy associated with a motor home justified the application of the
automobile exception. 4
This Note argues that the Court properly applied the automo-
bile exception to the warrantless search of the motor home in Carney
because of the vehicle'sfunction at the time of the searching. There
are two justifications for the automobile exception: the inherent
mobility of an automobile 5 and the lesser expectation of privacy as-
sociated with an automobile. 6 A motor home's ability to function
both as transportation and as a residence complicates the applica-
tion of the automobile exception. This complication arises because
of the Court's historic protection of an individual's fourth amend-
ment right to privacy in his or her home.
The automobile exception should be applied cautiously by the
1 California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066 (1985).
2 The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. It should be noted that the fourth amendment protects an indi-
vidual's privacy and not places. See Amsterdam, Perspectives On the Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REv. 349, 357 (1974) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
3 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924). For a discussion of the automobile
exception see infra notes 80-135 and accompanying text.
4 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2066-71.
5 See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
6 See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
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courts in the context of motor homes. Courts should apply it only
when the circumstances indicate that the motor home functioned
more like an automobile than a residence at the time of the search.
Carney's motor home functioned sufficiently like an automobile at
the time of the search that the application of the automobile excep-
tion was appropriate. The Court did not significantly alter or ex-
pand the automobile exception by applying the exception to the
search of the motor home.
II. THE FACTS IN CARNEY
On May 31, 1979, Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents
Williams and Peralta were engaged in an unrelated investigation
near a commercial plaza in downtown San Diego when they first ob-
served Charles Carney. 7 Agent Williams saw Carney approach and
talk to a minor.8 Carney and the minor subsequently walked to a
nearby public parking lot where they entered a Dodge mini-motor
home parked in the lot.9 Checking the vehicle's license number,
Williams discovered that the vehicle had previously been reported
by a local citizens' group, WeTip, for being involved in the sale of
illicit drugs. 10
In a letter, WeTip had reported that drugs were being distrib-
uted from the motor home by Carney and two other men.1 We-
Tip's letter stated that Carney and the others "operated out of the
Horton Plaza area and were involved in soliciting sex with young
boys in exchange for narcotics." 12 The group also reported that the
motor home's curtains were closed during those activities for peri-
ods ranging from ten minutes to two hours.13 This information was
uncorroborated .14
7 See People v. Carney, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430, 432 (1981). (Because the California
Supreme Court granted a hearing, People v. Carney has been omitted from the California
Appellate Reports. The original citation was 117 Cal. App. 3d 36 (1981). In this Note,
all subsequent citations to the appellate decision of People v. Carney will be made only to
the California Reporter.).
8 Id.
9 Id. The parking lot was located at the corner of two streets in San Diego, thus
providing convenient access to public thoroughfares. Id.
10 Id. WeTip stands for "We Turn In Pushers." Id. at 432 n.2. WeTip was an organ-
ization that relayed anonymously provided information concerning drug dealers to law
enforcement agencies. Id. at 432.
11 Id. WeTip reported that Carney, Lee Bowman and Lewis A. Gonzalez were dis-
tributing narcotics from the motor home. Id.
12 Id. The letter stated that the three men "'offer[ed] joints to young boys invited
them over to.. . [the motor home] to watch porno films then attempts [sic] to have sex
with them.'" Id.
'3 Id.
14 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
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Williams and Peralta observed Carney close the motor home's
curtains, effectively shielding the motor home's interior from all
outside view.15 Williams and other agents kept the motor home
under surveillance for approximately seventy-five minutes until the
minor left the vehicle.' 6 At that point, Williams and Peralta fol-
lowed the minor, and were soon joined by Agent Clem, a San Diego
Police Department narcotics officer. 17 The three agents stopped the
minor, identified themselves as law enforcement officials, and asked
the minor what he had been doing inside the motor home.' 8 The
minor told the agents the older man inside the motor home asked to
have sex with him and gave him a small bag of marijuana in ex-
change for doing so. 19 The minor later produced a small bag of
marijuana from his pants. 20
At the agent's request, the minor returned to the motor home,
knocked on its door, and asked Carney to step outside.21 After the
agents identified themselves, Carney complied. 22 Without either
Carney's consent or a search warrant,23 one agent briefly stepped in
the motor home to see if anyone else was inside. 24 Upon entering
the vehicle, the agent's initial search revealed drug paraphernalia
and a large amount of marijuana in plain view on a table.25
The motor home was subsequently driven to a nearby Narcotics
Task Force office.26 There, the motor home was subjected to a war-
rantless "inventory" search. 27 The "inventory" search revealed ad-
15 People v. Carney, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 432-33.




22 Id. The Supreme Court's opinion suggested that Carney stepped out of the mo-
tor home before the agents identified themselves. See Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
23 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067.
24 See People v. Carney, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
25 Id. Agent Clem saw a scale, a large quantity of marijuana and some ziploc bags on
a table inside the motor home. Id.
26 Id. The office was located in National City, California. Id.
27 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067. The courts have generally upheld warrantless inventory
searches whenever the initial seizing of the vehicle was lawful. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.4, at 556 (1978). In Carney,
the Court did not consider the initial and inventory searches individually. Carney, 105 S.
Ct. at 2067. Thus, the validity of the inventory search in Carney turned on the validity of
the initial search, an issue which was considered by the Court. An examination of the
constitutional validity of inventory searches is beyond the scope of this Note. Warrant-
less inventory searches, however, have come under constitutional attack by legal schol-
ars. For a discussion of the breadth and validity of inventory searches see Miles &
Wefing, The Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled Relationship, 4 SETON
HALL 105, 135-44 (1973); Reamey, Reevaluating the Vehicle Inventory, 19 CRIM. L. BULL.
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ditional quantities of marijuana in the motor home's refrigerator
and cupboards.
28
Carney was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana
for sale.29 At a preliminary hearing, Carney sought to suppress the
evidence seized from the motor home on the grounds that the
agents entered and searched the vehicle in violation of the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement.30 The presiding magistrate de-
nied the motion, finding that the initial search was a justified search
for other persons and that the second search was a routine "inven-
tory" search.
31
At trial the California Superior Court rejected Carney's motion
to suppress the evidence seized from the motor home.3 2 The Supe-
rior Court held that there was probable cause to arrest Carney, that
the search of the motor home was permissible under the automobile
exception, and that the motor home could be seized as the instru-
mentality of the crime.33 Carney pleaded nolo contendere to the
charges against him and was placed on three years probation.3 4
Carney appealed to the California Court of Appeals.35 The
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that the
automobile exception to the fourth amendment's warrant require-
ment could be applied to motor homes.3 6
The California Supreme Court reversed Carney's conviction.3 7
The court did not contest the trial court's conclusion that the DEA
agents had probable cause to arrest Carney and to believe that the
motor home contained evidence of a crime.38 The court, however,
rejected the application of the automobile exception to the search of
the motor home.3 9 The court held that the search of the motor
home was unreasonable because the agents did not first obtain a
search warrant.
40
325 (1983); Case Comment, The Automobile Inventory Search and Cady v. Dombrowski, 20
VILL. L. REv. 147 (1974).
28 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067-78.






35 Id. The California Court of Appeals' opinion in People v. Carney is reported at 172
Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981). See supra note 7.
36 See People v. Carney, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981).
37 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2068. The California Supreme Court's opinion in People v.
Carney is reported at 34 Cal. 3d 597, 668 P.2d 807, 194 Cal. Rptr. 500 (1981).





The California Supreme Court maintained that the traditional
rationale for the automobile exception, the inherent mobility of a
vehicle, was no longer a prime justification for the application of the
exception. 4 ' Rather, the court maintained that the automobile ex-
ception rested on the reduced expectation of privacy associated with
the vehicle.42 The court held that "a motor home is fully protected
by the fourth amendment and is not subject to the 'automobile ex-
ception,' "4 because "[w]hatever expectations of privacy those
travelling in an ordinary car have, those travelling in a motor home
have expectations that are significantly greater." 44 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
45
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN CARNEY
A. THE MAJORITY
The majority of the Supreme Court in California v. Carney46 re-
versed the California Supreme Court's decision and held that the
warrantless search of Carney's motor home was permissible under
the automobile exception to the fourth amendment's warrant re-
quirement.47 In doing so, the Supreme Court reasserted the vitality
of the "inherent mobility" justification for the automobile excep-
tion.48 Moreover, contrary to the view of the California Supreme
Court, the Court found that Carney's motor home could be given
the same reduced expectation of privacy accorded to an
automobile. 49
First, the majority noted that the inherent mobility of the auto-
mobile was the original justification for the automobile exception. 50
Affirming its position in Carroll v. United States, in which the automo-
bile exception was first articulated, the Court wrote that although
"the privacy interests in an automobile are constitutionally pro-
tected... the ready mobility of the automobile justifies a lesser de-
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Carney, 34 Cal. 3d at 610, 668 P.2d at 814, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
44 Id. at 609, 668 P.2d at 813, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 507 (quoting United States v. Wil-
liams, 630 F.2d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1980)).
45 California v. Carney, 104 S. Ct. 1589 (1984).
46 Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Powell, Blackmun, and White joined. Justice Stevens delivered
the dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
47 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2067-71.
48 See id. The Court did not address the California Supreme Court's dismissal of this
justification. See id.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 2068-69.
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gree of protection of those interests." 5 1 The majority found that the
mobility of a motor home was identical to "the ready mobility of the
automobile" 52 because the motor home was "obviously readily mo-
bile by the turn of a switch key" 53 and "[a]bsent the prompt search
and seizure, it could have readily been moved beyond the reach of
the police. ' 54 Second, the majority found that the expectation of
privacy associated with a motor home was, like that associated with
an automobile, significantly less than that relating to a home or of-
fice. 55 In fact, this lesser expectation of privacy has justified the ap-
plication of the automobile exception even where an automobile is
not immediately mobile.56 The majority further noted that an auto-
mobile's design contributed to a lower expectation of privacy "be-
cause the passenger compartment of a standard automobile is
relatively open to plain view." 57 The majority asserted that this re-
duced expectation of privacy did not derive from the fact that the
area searched is in plain view, but rather from "the pervasive regula-
tion of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways." 58
"Historically, 'individuals always [have] been on notice that movea-
ble vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to
probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband, without the
protection afforded by a magistrate's prior evaluation of those
facts.' "59 The majority noted that this pervasive regulation of vehi-
cles as a basis for the reduced expectation warranted the application
of the exception where "enclosed 'repository' areas have been
involved."
60
51 Id. at 2068. The majority relied on the Carroll Court's historic distinction between
stationary structures and vehicles because a "'vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.'" Id. at 2069 (quoting Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1974) (emphasis supplied in the Carney opin-
ion)). The majority noted that there is slight opportunity to search the vehicle because
of the vehicle's inherent mobility and that this mobility presents an exigency which pre-
cludes rigorous enforcement of the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. See id.
52 Id. at 2068.
53 Id. at 2070.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 2069. See also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976).
56 Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2069. See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1973).
57 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2069 (commenting on Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590
(1974)).
58 Id. at 2069.
59 Id. at 2070 (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 (1982)).
60 Id. at 2069. See e.g., United States v.Johns, 105 S. Ct. 881 (1985) (sealed package
inside a covered pick-up truck); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (packages in
a closed automobile trunk); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (locked automo-
bile trunk); Chambers v. Moroney, 392 U.S. 42 (1970) (closed compartment under the




The majority found that the motor home, like other vehicles
subject to the automobile exception, "was licensed to 'operate on
public streets; [was] serviced in public places;. . . and [was] subject
to extensive regulation and inspection.' "61 The majority added that
the motor home "was so situated [in the public parking lot] that an
objective observer would conclude that it was being used not as a
residence, but as a vehicle." 62 Consequently, the majority found




Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, attacked the majority's deci-
sion on two grounds. 64 First, the dissent maintained that the gen-
eral rule for constitutionally protected searches is that a search
warrant must be secured when it is reasonably practicable to do
so.6 5 Justice Stevens emphasized that the fourth amendment's war-
rant requirement, designed to protect individual privacy, should not
be easily set aside in favor of law enforcement efficiency in the form
of warrantless searches. 66 As such, the dissent framed the automo-
bile exception in narrow terms.
6 7
Second, Justice Stevens maintained that the inherent mobility
of a vehicle alone was not a sufficient justification for the application
of the automobile exception where the area searched had a high ex-
pectation of privacy associated with it.68 Carney's motor home had
61 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2069 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 154 (1978)
(Powell, J., concurring)). In Rakas, the Court held that persons, adversely effected only
through the introduction of evidence secured through an illegal search and seizure of a
third person's premises or property, did not have their fourth amendment rights vio-
lated. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 154.
62 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
63 See id. at 2068-71. The majority rejected Carney's contention that the motor home
should be distinguished from other vehicles covered by the automobile exception be-
cause the vehicle was "capable offunctioning as a motor home." Id. at 2070 (emphasis in
original). The majority refused to distinguish the motor home from other vehicles cov-
ered by the automobile exception because to do so would require the Court to "apply
the exception depending upon the size of the vehicle and the quality of its appoint-
ments." Id.
64 See id. at 2074-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65 See id. at 2074 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Carroll, the Court maintained that a
search warrant must be secured before law enforcement officials conduct a search where
it is reasonably practicable to do so. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1924).
66 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2074-75 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that:
"[tihe ascendancy of the Warrant Requirement in our system of justice must not be
bullied aside from extravagant claims of necessity .... " Id at 2075.
67 See id at 2075-76 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 2075 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that "[o]ur prior cases
teach us that inherent mobility is not a sufficient justification for the fashioning of an
1985]
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such a high expectation of privacy because "[mlotor homes, by their
common use and construction, afford their owners a substantial and
legitimate expectation of privacy when they dwell within." 69 The
dissent continued, asserting that where a motor home is removed
from the highway, American society is prepared to attach the same
expectation of privacy to the motor home as it has to fixed resi-
dences. 70 Because, under most circumstances, homes may only be
searched pursuant to a search warrant, 71 Justice Stevens asserted
that warrantless searches of motor homes were reasonable only
"when the motor home is traveling on the public streets or high-
ways, or when exigent circumstances otherwise require[d] an imme-
diate search without the expenditure of time necessary to obtain a
warrant." 72 The dissent maintained that the warrantless search was
unconstitutional and admonished the DEA agents for failing to se-
cure a warrant before conducting the search.73 Because the motor
home was parked in a parking lot near a courthouse where a search
warrant could have easily been obtained,74 Justice Stevens would





Both the majority and the dissent in Carney maintained that the
DEA agents had the requisite probable cause to search Carney's mo-
tor home.76 The two sides disagreed, however, on the extent to
which the fourth amendment's warrant requirement should have
been applied to the search of the motor home. The majority's hold-
ing gives rise to two questions. First, was the Court's application of
the automobile exception consistent with prior applications of the
exception to the warrant requirement, especially in the face of heightened expectations
of privacy in the location searched." Id. at 2075.
69 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70 See id. at 2075 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent further maintained that the Court had
never considered whether the "practical justification that apply to a vehicle that is
stopped in transit on a public way apply with the same force to a vehicle parked in a lot
near a court house where it could easily be detained while a warrant is issued." Id.
73 See id. at 2076 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that "[t]he officers
plainly had probable cause to arrest the petitioner and search the motor home, and on
this record, it is inexplicable why they eschewed the safe harbor of a warrant." Id at
2076 (footnote omitted).
74 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75 See id. at 2071-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76 See id. at 2071 (majority opinion); id. at 2076 (dissenting opinion).
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exception? Second, if it was not, was the automobile exception
properly expanded?
In Carney, neither side disputed that the motor home could
function as a motor vehicle.77 An examination of the Court's ratio-
nales justifying the automobile exception is required before one can
conclude that the exception was properly applied in Carney.
B. INHERENT MOBILITY
In Carroll v. United States, 78 the Court established its first justifi-
cation for the automobile exception to the fourth amendment's war-
rant requirement where police officers conducted a warrantless
search of an automobile after it had been stopped for probable
cause in transit upon the highway. 79 The Court found that
automobiles presented a unique exigency in that they can be
"quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the war-
rant must be sought."8 0 The Court was concerned that contraband
goods concealed and transported in such quickly mobile vehicles
could be placed beyond the reach of law enforcement officials
before a search warrant could be secured and the search executed. 8'
ChiefJustice Taft, writing for the Court, maintained that warrantless
automobile searches could be conducted only if the law enforce-
ment officials conducting the search had "probable cause for believ-
ing that . . . [the] vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise."8 2 The Court qualified the automobile exception by
adding that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably
practicable, it must be used."8 3 Consequently, the Court upheld the
77 See id.
78 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
79 See id. The search revealed contraband alcohol behind the seats of the vehicle. Id
at 136. One commentator would apply the automobile exception or "Carroll doctrine"
based solely on the inherent mobility justification. See Moylan, The Automobile Exception:
What It Is and What It Is Not - A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REv.
987 (1976). Moylan believes that the only justification for the automobile exception
should be the inherent mobility justification first articulated in Carroll. See id. at 987-88.
Moylan stated that "under the Carroll doctrine we are interested in but two things: (1)
was there probable cause to believe that the automobile contained evidence? and (2) was
there an exigency requiring an immediate warrantless search? Stick to the checklist!"
Id. at 1013. See also infra note 112.
80 Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153.
81 See id. at 143-53. The Court's reliance on this argument indicates a concern with
law enforcement efficiency and a balancing of that concern against the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirement. See id.
82 Id. at 154.
83 Id at 156. It appears that the Court found the situation in Carroll to be one where




search of the automobile.8 4
In Carney, the motor home was not stopped in transit, but rather
was parked in a public parking lot with its engine off.8 5 Further, the
motor home's curtains were drawn to block all outside view of the
interior and there was no indication that the motor home was about
to depart prior to Agent Clem's entry of the vehicle. 86 These facts
distinguish Carney from Carroll, and several other Supreme Court
cases in which warrantless searches have been upheld under the au-
tomobile exception.8 7 Nonetheless, the exception was properly ap-
plied in Carney because of the possibility that some unseen or
unknown individual could have removed the motor home from the
reach of law enforcement officials.
The Court has not applied the automobile exception to the war-
rantless searches of stationary vehicles under all circumstances.
Specifically, the Court has tended not to apply the exception where
it was not practicable for the suspect, a suspected accomplice, or
other interested party to remove the vehicle from the reach of the
police. For example, in 1971, in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,88 the
Court refused to apply the automobile exception to the warranfless
search of an automobile parked in the suspect's driveway.8 9 In Coo-
lidge, the police had known for "some time" prior to the search that
the suspect's automobile had a probable role in the crime. 90 The
Court maintained that it had not been reasonably impracticable to
secure a warrant prior to the search because the police had been
investigating the suspect for over two and one half weeks.9 1 Neither
the suspect in police custody, nor his wife in the company of police,
were in a position to remove the vehicle prior to its removal by the
police, thus negating the possibility of the vehicle's removal from
the reach of the police prior to the search.9 2
84 Id. at 162.
85 See People v. Carney, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33.
86 See id.
87 See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1969). In Ross, the police stopped a vehicle and conducted a warrandess search
of a previously observed vehicle's interior, trunk, and a paper bag found within the trunk
based on an informants tip. Ross, 456 U.S. at 801-02. The Court upheld the search
under the automobile exception. Id. at 825. In Chambers, the police stopped and seized
a vehicle containing robbery suspects. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 44-5. The vehicle was im-
mediately driven to the police station where a warrantless search was executed. Id. The
Court upheld the search under the automobile exception. Id. at 52.
88 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
89 See id. at 458-64.
90 Id. at 460.
91 Id. at 460-62.




By contrast, three years later in Cardwell v. Lewis,93 the Court
upheld the warrantless search of an automobile parked in a public
parking lot.94 The Court in Cardwell deemphasized the practicability
of securing a search warrant and indicated a willingness to allow
warrantless searches of vehicles upon a finding of probable cause
because of the exigency arising from a vehicle's mobility.95 The
Court noted that, for constitutional purposes, no practical differ-
ence existed between seizing and holding a vehicle while securing a
warrant from a magistrate and executing a warrantless search.96
" 'Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.' -97 The Court indicated that whether the
vehicle had been stopped and seized while in transit was not consti-
tutionally determinative. 98 "The fact that. . . Lewis' car was seized
from a public parking lot [as opposed to being stopped and seized
while in transit] has little, if any, legal significance." 99 The Court
indicated, however, that it would continue to consider the possibil-
ity that the vehicle could be removed from the scene while a warrant
was sought in deciding whether to validate a warrantless search. 100
In Cardwell, the Court noted that Lewis' vehicle "was seized from a
public place where access was not meaningfully restricted."'u 0
On balance, the Court has favored applying the automobile ex-
ception when it was possible for some individual to remove the vehi-
cle because of the vehicle's inherent mobility, and when it was not
reasonably practicable to secure a search warrant prior to the
93 417 U.S. 583 (1974). The Court in Cardwell relied heavily on its prior decision in
Chambers v. Moroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1979). Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 593-596. In Chambers,
the Court upheld the warrantless search of an automobile after the suspect had been
arrested and the vehicle had been towed to the police station. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at
52.
94 Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 583-88. The search was conducted at the police impound
lot. Id. at 587.
95 See id. at 594-96.
96 Id. at 594.
97 Id. at 594 (quoting Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52). The Cardwell Court continued that
"'[t]he probable-cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did the mobility
of the car unless the Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the
denial of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In that event there is little to
choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a war-
rant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained.'" Id. Moylan noted that
"[giranted the major premise [that there is no constitutional difference between
searches and seizures], the conclusion does at least follow validly." Moylan, supra note
79, at 1003. Whether there is a constitutional difference between searches and seizures
is a question which, in the final analysis, may be a matter of individual preference.
98 See Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 593-96.
99 Idl at 594.
100 See id. at 593-96.
101 Id. at 593.
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search. 102 Given these considerations, it was consistent with Carroll,
Coolidge and Cardwell for the Court in Carney to apply the automobile
exception to the initial search of the motor home. Like the automo-
bile in Cardwell, the motor home in Carney was parked in a public
parking lot'0 3 where, absent seizure, it could have been removed.
The motor home was, as the majority in Carney noted, "obviously
mobile by the turn of a switch key,"' 1 4 a characteristic it shares with
all properly maintained motor vehicles. Further, Carney, although
in the presence of the DEA agents, could have attempted to escape
by reentering the motor home and driving away. The situation in
Carney is distinguishable from that in Coolidge, where the police re-
stricted access to the vehicle and had more than two weeks in which
to secure a warrant. 10 5
The Court was correct to apply the automobile exception in
Carney particularly because of the strong possibility that Carney was
not alone in the motor home. Although the agents had not ob-
served anyone other than Carney and the minor enter the vehicle, 10 6
the anonymous tip that described the vehicle and named Carney
also named two other men as participants in the distribution of nar-
cotics from the motor home. 107 One or both men, or some un-
known individual(s), could have been within the vehicle before the
agent's surveillance began.108 There is no mention in any of the
appellate court opinions that the DEA agents saw that the motor
home was unoccupied prior to Carney's entrance and the closing of
the motor home's curtains.' 0 9 Clearly, Agent Clem's look inside the
motor home for additional persons was reasonable and prudent
under the circumstances because of the exigency that a concealed
individual within the motor home could present.
This exigency makes untenable the dissent's position in Carney
that the DEA agents should have secured a search warrant before
looking inside the motor home for other persons." 0 The Court
102 See supra notes 78-101 and accompanying text.
103 People v. Carney, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
104 Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2070.
105 See People v. Carney, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
106 See id. at 430-32.
107 Id. at 432.
108 In fact, Agent Williams testified that Agent Clem stepped into the motor home to
see if anyone else was inside for "safety reasons" before observing the contraband in
plain view. Id. at 433.
109 See id. at 432-33. The minor also stated that the "older man" spoke to him. Id at
433. It was reasonable to infer from the minor's statement that Carney was not alone
inside the motor home.
110 The exigency referred to is the same one referred to in Carroll. The vehicle could
have fled the scene, placing the evidence beyond the reach of law enforcement officials.
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noted in Cardwell that there is no constitutional difference between
seizing a vehicle while a search warrant is pursued and conducting a
warrantless search of the vehicle. Either course is acceptable under
the constitution.111 As such, the agent's decision to look inside the
vehicle, instead of seizing it, was constitutional. Even if one rejects
the Court's contention in Chambers that searches and seizures are
equally intrusive and instead accepts the dissent's contention in Car-
ney that the agents should have obtained a warrant before entering
the vehicle, reason dictates that the agents would have had to seize
the motor home to prevent its departure while a warrant was being
secured. Due to the vehicle's inherent mobility and the peculiar
facts of the case, such a seizure would have required the agents to
take complete control of the motor home, in effect, to have acted
precisely as they did.
C. EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
The second justification for the automobile exception is the re-
duced expectation of privacy associated with a vehicle. 112 Whether
this justification warrants the application of the automobile excep-
tion to the warrantless search of the motor home is more problem-
atic, however. This difficulty arises because of a motor home's
hybrid nature -its ability to function both as transportation and as
a residence." 1
The Court has advanced several reasons for the reduced expec-
tation of privacy associated with a vehicle. In Cardwell, the Court
maintained that there is a reduced expectation of privacy associated
with a motor vehicle "because its function is transportation and it
seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal
effects."' 14 The Court in Cardwell continued that motor vehicles
I1I See Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 594. Further, Moylan's "checklist" is satisfied in Carney,
resulting in the application of the automobile exception. See supra note 79. See also supra
notes 84-111 and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). In Opperman, the Court
upheld the warrantless search of an automobile after the defendant had been arrested
for numerous traffic violations and the vehicle had been towed to the police lot. Id. at
376. One commentator has rejected using a reduced expectation of privacy as ajustifi-
cation for the automobile exception because the rationales supporting this justification
are, in his view, untenable. See Katz, Automobile Searches and Diminished Expectations in the
Warrant Clause, 19 AM. Cram. L. REv. 557, 569-72 (1982). Professor Katz maintains that
the Court's focus on the reduced expectation of privacy justification has reduced con-
cern for the mobility and exigent circumstances justifications for the automobile excep-
tion. Id. Professor Katz also notes that personal possessions are sometimes stored in
automobiles and that there is not an adequate loss of privacy in an automobile to war-
rant a reduced standard. Id. See also supra note 97.
113 See Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066.
114 Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590.
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travel "public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its con-
tents are in plain view." 115 Two years later, in South Dakota v.
Opperman,116 the Court articulated another rationale for the reduced
expectation of privacy, i.e., that vehicles are subject to pervasive and
continuing government regulations while fixed residences are not
subject to such invasive regulations.1 17 The Court in Opperman
noted that vehicles are stopped and inspected periodically to deter-
mine if they are in compliance with licensing, inspection, safety, and
emission regulations.1 18 Recently, in United States v. Ross,119 the
Court noted that "individuals always had been on notice that mova-
ble vessels may be stopped and searched on facts giving rise to
probable cause that the vehicle contains contraband.... 120
Thus, the Court has applied a lower expectation of privacy in an
automobile than in a home because of a vehicle's usual function as
transportation, the fact that its interior is subject to public view, the
pervasive government regulation of vehicles, and the public notice
that individuals do not enjoy the same level of privacy in a vehicle
that they do in a fixed residence.
Applying those conditions to the facts in Carney, it is clear that a
motor home is quite capable of traveling public highways and does
afford the public some, albeit limited, view of the vehicle's interior.
Other equally mobile vehicles may also afford a limited view of the
vehicle's interior because of such appointments as tinted glass, cur-
tains, shades, or an elevated chassis which can marginally increase
the expectation of privacy associated with a vehicle. Even if there is
a marginal increase in the expectation of privacy because the motor
home's curtains were drawn, this expectation can never be as great
as the expectation of privacy associated with a home, which has a
greater expectation of privacy associated with it even when all doors
and windows are open.
An analysis of the other rationales for the reduced expectation
of privacy associated with a vehicle more conclusively demonstrates
115 Id.
116 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
117 Id. at 368.
118 Id.
119 456 U.S. 798 (1978).
120 Id. at 806, n.8. In Ross, the Court referred to the federal statutes passed between
1789 and 1815 that the Carroll Court focused on for its support of the proposition that
there is a constitutional difference between searches of stationary structures and movea-
ble vehicles. See id. at 806-07. See also Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149-53
(1924). The earlier statutes referred to the searches of ships and vessels by customs
officials. See 1 Stat 627, 677-78 (1799); 1 Stat. 309, 315 (1793); 1 Stat. 145, 170 (1790);
1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789). In 1815, customs officials were permitted to search any vehicles,
beasts, or persons for illegally imported goods. See 3 Stat. 231-32 (1815).
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the applicability of the automobile exception in Carney. In Carney,
the motor home was a licensed and regulated vehicle. 12 Thus, the
motor home was subject to many of the same invasive government
regulations and controls applicable to automobiles and other motor
vehicles.' 22 Further, the government regulation and control of mo-
tor homes as motor vehicles, combined with public notice that read-
ily moveable vehicles can be searched without a warrant, obviously
gives rise to an expectation of privacy that is substantially less than
that associated with a fixed residence.
Finally, there is the Court's consideration that there is a re-
duced expectation of privacy associated with automobiles because
automobiles usually function as transportation and seldom serve as
a residence or repository of personal effects. 123 The function of the
motor home in Carney is dispositive of whether the automobile ex-
ception should have been applied. In Carney, the dissent urged that
a motor home should be treated more like a fixed residence than
like an automobile in terms of the associated expectation of privacy,
thereby precluding the application of the automobile exception.'
24
The dissent maintained that motor homes are "designed to accom-
modate a breadth of ordinary everyday living."' 25 By contrast, the
majority implicitly concluded that it is the motor home's function,
and not its capabilities, at the time the search was conducted, that is
properly dispositive of whether the automobile exception should be
applied.' 26 On this point, the majority's view is clearly correct.
Any vehicle is capable of serving more than one function. An
121 See People v. Carney, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 432. This is apparent from the license
number that Agent Williams copied from the motor home. See id.
122 Most states require that motor vechiles comply with various safety and emission
regulations during the life of the vehicle. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 2804 (West 1971)
(a member of the California Highway Patrol, upon reasonable belief that a vehicle is
being operated in violation of any provision of the vehicle code, can require the driver to
stop and submit to an inspection of the vehicle and its equipment). Those regulations
are most often enforced by periodic inspection of the vehicle's interior and exterior. See,
e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAy. LAw §§ 8301-03 (McKinney 1970) (New York requires the peri-
odic inspection of all motor vehicles each year at official inspection cites in order to
check for compliance with equipment and safety standards). By contrast, fixed resi-
dences are subject to government construction and safety regulations prior to occu-
pancy. See, e.g., CAL. HEArH & Siu'r CODE § 17980 (West 1971) (buildings are subject
to the standards of the California State Building Standards Code). In some municipali-
ties, barring a complaint by a resident, enforcement of those regulations seldom re-
quires inspection of the structure's interior once the individual has taken residence in
the structure. See Howe, Housing Code Enforcement in Eleven Cities, 60 U.. DEr. J. Un. L.
373 (1983).
123 See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
124 See Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2074-78.
125 Ide at 2077 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
126 See id at 2070.
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automobile can sometimes function as a residence in addition to its
primary function as transportation.1 27 A motor home, as a hybrid of
a vehicle and a residence, is readily capable of functioning as either.
As such, it makes little sense to categorize a motor home as either a
vehicle or a residence for fourth amendment purposes without first
giving consideration to the motor home's function in the particular
circumstance.
While the majority in Carney categorically rejected classifying
vehicles according to their various appointments for fourth amend-
ment purposes,1 28 it appears that the majority focused upon the mo-
tor home's function at the time the search was conducted when
considering whether to apply the automobile exception.1 29 The ma-
jority stated that "the.. . [motor home] was so situated [in the pub-
lic parking lot] that an objective observer would conclude that it was
being used not as a residence, but as a vehicle." 130 A public parking
lot is unlike a campground, rest area, or other area designated for
the purposes of establishing a temporary residence. The Court cor-
rectly understood that it would be rare for a municipality to permit
the parking of motor homes in public parking lots for the purpose of
establishing a temporary residence, instead of temporary parking. 1
31
Under this scenario, the majority indicated that various objec-
tive indicia would bear on whether the motor home was being used
as a residence at the time of the search. 32 The majority stated that
some of the criteria to be considered included "whether the vehicle
is readily mobile or. . . elevated on blocks, whether the vehicle is
licensed, whether it is connected to utilities, and whether it has con-
venient access to a public road."' 33 The motor home in Carney met
none of these criteria for residential status when the search was con-
ducted.' 34 Accordingly, the reduced expectation of privacy associ-
ated with the vehicle in these particular circumstances justifies the
application of the automobile exception to the warranfless search of
the motor home in Carney.
127 See Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 591.
128 See Caney, 105 S. Ct. at 2077 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 See id. at 2069-71.
130 Id. at 2070.
131 In any event, an individual would have a low expectation of privacy in a public
parking lot because of the constant comings and goings.
132 See Carney, 105 S. Ct. at 2071, n.3.
133 Id. These factors would be relevant in considering the search of any vehicle that
could be arguably said to be functioning as a residence at the time of the search.
134 See People v. Carney, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 432-33. In Carney, the motor home was read-




The United States Supreme Court properly applied the auto-
mobile exception to the warrantless search of a motor home in Cali-
fornia v. Carney because of the vehcile's function at the time of the
search. Both the inherent mobility and the reduced expectation of
privacy, the underlying rationales for the exception, are satisfied in
Carney. Further, the Court did not significantly alter or expand the
automobile exception by applying the exception to the search of a
stationary motor home. Even though the motor home potentially
could have come within the fourth amendment's warrant require-
ment under other facts (for example, if the motor home had been
parked in a campground and was connected to utilities), in this con-
text the motor home's primary function at the time the search was
conducted was as a vehicle. Thus, the underlying rationales justify-
ing the automobile exception for warrantless searches of vehicles
were satisfied. Any subsequent warrantless searches of motor
homes or of other hybrid vehicles, however, should be carefully ex-
amined in light of these principles and the vehicle's function at the
time of the search.
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